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Abstract
Study of determinants of firm size is important for policy making and economic
theory, because much of economic growth takes place within firms and firms are
prevailing form of organisation of production units in modern economies. Theory
o↵ers contradictory views on e↵ect of quality of regulations and rule of law on firm
size. Better regulatory quality in the environment of post-soviet countries enables
firms to become larger. In the case of rule of law, the relationship seems to be rather
fragile and of a more complex nature with ambiguous e↵ects, hence the matter re-
mains subject of future research. Regulatory quality and rule of law explain only
very little part of variations in growth rates of firms.
Keywords: firm size determination, quality of regulations, rule of law, industrial
organisation
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Abstrakt
Studium determinant̊u velikosti firem je d̊uležité pro vytvářeńı politik i ekonomickou
teorii, protože velká část ekonomického r̊ustu je zp̊usobena r̊ustem existuj́ıćıch firem
a firmy jsou převažuj́ıćı formou organizace produkčńıch jednotek v moderńıch eko-
nomikách. Teorie přináš́ı protich̊udné pohledy na vliv kvality regulace a právńıho
státu na velikost firem. V prostřed́ı postsovětských zemı́ je r̊ust kvality regulace
spojený s r̊ustem velikosti firem. Vztah kvality právńıho státu a velikosti firem v
tomto prostřed́ı se jev́ı jako slabý a má komplexněǰśı podstatu, tud́ıž tato záležitost
z̊ustává otevřená pro daľśı výzkum. Kvalita regulace a právńıho státu vysvětluje jen
velmi malou část rozd́ıl̊u v rychlosti r̊ustu firem.
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Proposed topic Determination of firm boundaries: Influence of regulati-
ons and rule of law on firm size
Topic characteristics The aim of the thesis is to find out the nature of relations
between firm size and conditions in which the firm operates, namely characteristics
of the institutional framework.
If the results turn out to be interesting, it could help policymakers to establish
rules and policies in a way which would promote economic growth, design corporate
law in a manner which would not interfere with natural development of the orga-
nizational structure of the economy. Also, in broader sense, the implications could
help entrepreneurs in designing optimal business model for specific conditions.
I will work with data on size distributions of firms in di↵erent post-soviet coun-
tries and time periods and information on the nature of business environment in the
specific countries and time periods, because the specific environment of post-soviet
countries may alter the results of similar analysis which had been already performed
on samples of di↵erent countries in both developed and developing world. I will pro-
ject relevant characteristics of di↵erent institutional frameworks in those countries
and changes of those over time and in the end look into the relations of all of these
through various regressions of the obtained data.
Hypotheses
• Rule of law and better quality of regulations enables growth in size of firms
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• Institutional characteristics such as rule of law or quality of regulations are a
good starting point for determination of optimal firm size
• The specifics of the culture in post-soviet countries may have an influence on
the way institutional factors determine optimal firm size
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Size of firms is a fascinating field of study, because the mechanics behind it influence
a great deal of organisation of economic activities.
Firstly, the study of determination of boundaries between firms has many prac-
tical implications. The boundaries between firms are crucial for financing decisions,
the insight may be really helpful for the actors on financial markets. Research in
the optimal firm size and factors determining it may also bring highly practical
sugestions for planning of mergers and acquisitions. What is more, research on the
best managerial techniques and organisational hierarchies within firms, which may
improve the day-to-day e ciency of firms can utilize insights of the mechanisms of
determination of boundaries of firms as well. Also, a big part of economic growth
takes place within organisational structures with growth of their size (Rajan & Zin-
gales, 1998). Because of that, it is extremely useful to know what the incentives of
growth of firms when thinking about factors behind economic growth in general are.
Secondly, the study of firm size contributes to the overall framework of economics.
It is necessary to think about the organisational structure of economy in order to
apply the implications of both microeconomics and macroeconomics at convenient
organisational levels and within the organisational boundaries. If microeconomics
o↵ers insights into behaviour of individual actors in the marketplace and macroeco-
nomics into the phenomena in economy as a whole, third view on how the individual
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actors (and on what levels) are formed is needed. When looking at the real world
economy of 21st century, it is clear firms play crucial role in its organisational struc-
ture and in the way production factors are channeled into the production process.
If we understood the process of determination of boundaries between firms, it would
greatly contribute to understanding of firms itself, which is crucial for understand-
ing of the workings of the whole economy with implications for both analysis and
policymaking.
Most of comprehensive theory of a firm builds on the classic paper by Coase (1937),
who identified a key role of transaction costs in the process of creation of firms,
because some transaction costs may be diminished by internal firm organisational
structure rather than by market mechanisms based on price signals (Cheung 1983;
Powell 1990). The factors determining firm size can be viewed from di↵erent per-
spectives, ranging from neoclassical view based on technological factors (Kremer,
1993), elaboration on Coase’s organisational view of transaction costs (e.g. Cordes
et al., 2008) to rather recent studies based on the theory of networks (Beinhocker,
2007). Unfortunately, the most recent findings in the field have not yet been fully
incorporated in a really broad theoretical framework, as most of the research con-
centrates more or less on particular issues. Vast variety of the general implications
of those theories has been successfully empirically tested, e.g. Kumar, Rajan &
Zingales (2001) show that firms in capital-intensive industries tend to be larger.
Better rule of law is needed for e↵ective managerial control within a larger firm
on one side (Yi Man Li, 2008), while on the other improves e ciency of market
contracts, and thus lessens the incentive to organise more activities within firms
without e ciency-driving price signals (Khanna & Palepu, 2000; Pascali, 2009).
The theory does not give any definite answer on which of these forces is stronger in
what circumstances.
Similarly, low quality of regulations is seen as a fixed cost for firms on one side
and as such drive them to become larger (Klapper, Laeven & Rajan, 2006; Brad-
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ford, 2004). On the other side, distortive regulations often favour smaller firms and
discourage organisation of production within larger firms in general (Ardagna &
Lusardi, 2008; Nystrom, 2008). Once again, the theory has no predictive power on
which of these forces is stronger and similarly, as for the quality of legal framework,
the definite answer remains to be an empirical question and, as both of these institu-
tional factors are important in firm size determination, the whole problem deserves
careful consideration.
The objective of this thesis is to synthesise factors of firm determination from vari-
ous parts of economic theory and to enrich empirical findings in one particular field
where the theory gives contradictory implications - overall e↵ects of changes in the
quality of regulations and legal framework on firm size. This is done on a sample
of the post-soviet countries. Theoretical conclusions have not been tested on these
before and the post-soviet specifics may alter the results of the analysis compared
to other regions where similar empirical studies have been carried (e.g. on the case
of US Calcagno & Sobel, 2013). The organisational structure within economy is a
result of broad behavioural patterns deeply rooted in the society, the cultural dif-
ferences specific for post-soviet countries may have strong e↵ect on the workings of
the mechanisms determining firm size.
The thesis is structured as follows: section 2 builds a broad theoretical framework
for determination of size of firms and its implications for the regulations and rule of
law. Section 3 utilizes the theory in empirical application on post-soviet countries -
where section 3.1 describes the methodology, section 3.2 used data and section 3.3
presents the results. Finally, section 4 presents conclusions based on the analysis




2.1 Definition of firm
There is some common understanding of what a firm is. If one says Apple or the
local bakery, it pretty easily creates an image of legal entity guiding an institution,
where managers organise workforce and capital in production of goods or services.
However, when looking at how businesses operate in detail, the image of a firm be-
comes somehow blurred.
Definition of a firm based on the legal entity is straightforward, but it turns out
to be too meretricious concept for economic analysis, because the boundaries drawn
by law are rather artificial and do not necessarily correspond to the division of real
power and hierarchical control, decision-making and economic activities guiding the
production of goods and services. Even such technocratic body as eurostat recog-
nises this phenomenon in its definition of enterprise:
An enterprise is defined as the smallest combination of legal units that
is an organisational unit producing goods or services, which benefits
from a certain degree of autonomy in decision-making, especially for the
allocation of its current resources. An enterprise carries out one or more
activities at one or more locations. (OECD 2001, p.1)
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What is a certain degree of autonomy? Is it connected with the legal boundaries be-
tween firms? The Property Rights view suggests (Grossman & Hart, 1986) that the
common ownership of assets is what matters and makes clear-cut distinction between
control exercised via property rights and contracts with other entities (e.g. because
of the residual rights not covered by contracts). However, when confronted with
real-world examples, it seems this practical distinction cannot cover the complexity
of di↵erences between organisational structures of di↵erent firms. Some uniquely
owned unique legal entities give an unprecedented autonomy to its di↵erent plants.
On the other side, some production processes and patterns performed by distinct
legal entities owned by many di↵erent owners may be thought of as a firm in the eco-
nomic sense as e.g. the control of Toyota over its suppliers may be of great strength
because of the limited use of their products (Kumar, Rajan & Zingales, 2001).
If we stick to a merely practical point of view, we can use the definition given
by Alfred D. Chandler, who sees firm as a
Collection of operating units, each with its own specific facilities and per-
sonnel, whose combined resources and activities are coordinated, mon-
itored, and allocated by a hierarchy of middle and top managers. It is
the existence of this hierarchy that makes the activities and operations of
the whole enterprise more than the sum of its operating units (Chandler
1994, p.15)
It is clear firms may embody many di↵erent forms. The unit of production may be
only one separate plant or an international institution with dozens of branches. A
common feature is some kind of organisation of the production procedure, where
inputs are transformed into goods, services or other outputs and sold in a profit
maximising way. Typically, these activities are under control of top management,
which is supervised by a body such as board of directors which, to some extent,
represents the owners of the firm. Managers also take care of assets of the firm.
The functional structures may vary greatly in both the degree of centralisation and
autonomy of di↵erent branches (Shepherd & Shepherd, 2004).
5
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Firm with such a managerial hiearchy where management is separated from the
owners of the firm is historically relatively new phenomenon and emerged only with
developement of technologies which are connected to large economies of scale. The
hierarchies were usually created along the functional lines. Of course, it is extremely
di cult to generalise in how the modern corporations of today evolved from the
simple entrepreneurship, Alfred Chandler described the typical process as follows:
Each function was administred by a department. The largest and first
to be formed were those for production and sales, with a smaller one for
purchasing. At the headquaters of these functional departments middle
managers coordinated and monitored the activities of the lower-level
managers who administred the enterprise’s operating units - its several
factories, its sales and purchasing o ces, and its research laboratories.
(Chandler 1994, p.32)
All the definitions given so far were more or less results of practical perception of a
firm, but it is necessary to be aware of the underlying theoretical assumptions.
Most of the neoclassical microeconomics was built upon a firm as a black-box and,
to some extent, exogenous entity (Spulber, 2009). It is a building bloc of the the-
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ory, basic unit following the predicted behavioural patterns in the marketplace, but
studied merely from outside. As firms and their structure have great influence on
day-to-day workings of the economy, comprehensive theory explaining the internal
mechanisms behind existence of firms was needed.
On one side, in the neoclassical view of complete contracts, fully informed and
rational agents leave the firm to be fully described by its production function. Firm
is seen as
a production set that transforms one set of commodities into another,
and a market as a coming together of firms and consumers to exchange
commodities (Milgrom & Roberts 1988, p.456)
But as the role of information asymmetry is crucial for the organisation of firms,
the neoclassical view o↵ers only very limited insights.
On the other side, view of incomplete contracts elaborates on the transaction costs
and o↵ers much more valuable implications for real world problems. This piece of
theory builds upon the work of R. H. Coase and his groundbreaking paper ”The
Nature of the Firm” from 1937. Coase was well aware of the importance of pre-
cise definition of firm. In his work, the central distiguishing element is that many
proceses in the economic activities in production patterns (such as allocation of
factors of production) are not governed by the price mechanism (as neoclassical eco-
nomics assumes). Quite the contrary, within firms, decision-making is based on the
hierarchical power without direct tie to price signals.
If a workman moves from department Y to department X, he does not
go because of a change in relative prices, but because he is ordered to
do so. Those who object to economic planning on the grounds that the
problem is solved by price movements can be answered by pointing out
that there is planning within our economic system which is quite di↵erent
from the individual planning mentioned above and which is akin to what
is normally called economic planning. (Coase 1937, p.388)
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From this point of view, firms can be seen as cells playing unconsciously a role in a
larger organism based on price signals and market forces (only trying to maximise
their profit), while the workings of the cells itself are determined by managerial
control within the firms (Dobb, 1925).
It may be insightful to think about firms and structure of their boundaries within
economies in a broader context. Definite boundaries between individual firms are
very hard to draw, patterns within some companies (as legal entities) may act as
firms within firms. The managerial structure may vary with di↵erent functional
purposes, central authority may be exercised in some situations and autonomous
decision-making in other. Decisions in relationships between distinct legal entities
may be guided by price signals to some extent while the production process inter-
dependencies still matter somehow. The whole structural form of ties of power,
control, ownership, decision-making, production processes and so on in the economy
is a rather complicated network. This new perspective on boundaries of firms may
utilise implications about economies of scale or complexity problems of the theory
of networks and therefore should be incorporated into the analysis of factors behind
size of firms as well (Beinhocker, 2007).
2.2 Reasons why firms exist
Why do firms exist? Naturally, there are many di↵erent reasons, but most of them
go down to the simple fact it is e cient. Lets start with the classic transaction costs
view which has a great explanatory power.
Why the price system cannot ensure guidance for production? Why is any organisa-
tion needed at all with all the market forces acting towards e ciency? The neoclas-
sical assumptions needed for market transactions to be the best possible option are
not met in the real world. While the price signals may work in theory, discovering
and assigning the relevant prices is not costless. This information imperfection yields
costs to every additional contract negotiated on the market. Intuitively, it may be
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more e cient to make one lump-sum contract instead of dozens of similar ones, e.g.
to employ a worker for a certain period of time instead of contracting every little
bit of work he does, as these activities are hard to predict and bargaining costs
would surely occur if separate contracts would needed to be negotiated for every
new task the worker does. In this situation, when the transaction costs are high,
the ine ciencies of central planning within an economic unit caused by imperfect
information available to the manager may be overweighted. Similar logic as for the
employed worker may be used in explaining why organisation within a firm between
suppliers and receivers of commodities may be desirable. The market-based con-
tracts are ine cient because of uncertainty about future and inability to asses the
risks between the sides of the contract in a way so that unpredicted changes would
incentivise behaviour which would lead to economically e cient outcomes, no mat-
ter what the unpredicted changes are. The borderline of this classic view is that the
driving force in forming firms in the market is the uncertainty about future which
makes it impossible to eliminate transaction costs and therefore makes authoritarian
decision-making within certain hierarchy more e cient in certain cases (Coase, 1937)
Walter W. Powel summarizes in his 1990 paper ”Neither market nor hierarchy:
network forms of organization” the specifics of di↵erent transactions as follows:
transactions that involve uncertainty about their outcome, that recur
frequently and require substantial ”transactionspecific investments” of
money, time or energy that cannot be easily transferred are more likely
to take place within hierarchically organized firms. Exchanges that are
straightforward, nonrepetitive and require no transaction specific invest-
ment will take place across a market interface. Hence transactions are
moved out of markets into hierarchies as knowledge specific to the trans-
action (asset specificity) builds up. When this occurs, the ine ciencies
of bureaucratic organization are preferred to the relatively greater costs
of market transactions. (Powell 1990, p. 303)
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Steven Cheung elaborates on one specific element of transaction costs - measurement
costs (in form of costs of knowing the product), which had been somehow omitted by
Coase, and gives more intuitive explanation of how this factor incenivises emergence
of firms:
Reaching agreement on the price of a spring inside a camera incurs a
proportionately higher cost than does the camera. Although the con-
sumer has the final say in assessing the worth of the whole product, he
cannot be expected to recognize the value of each component parthe may
not even know what some of them are or even that they exist.... ...for
a component which by itself has no readily identifiable value, agreement
on price is less costly between specialists and input owners than it would
be between input owners and consumers or between specialists and con-
sumers. The one who produces component parts tends to know more
about them than the one who consumes (Cheung 1983, p.209)
From the institutional point of view, it is important to realise how government poli-
cies influence the nature and scope of firms. Given all the organisational reasoning
above, it is highly counter-intuitive to take institutional factors as the driving force
behind creation of firms in economy. However, the distorting e↵ects imposed by
the government policies may have huge consequences regarding our analysis. Two
major institutional elements with impact on firms are the financing and regulatory
framework.
As can be seen on many real-world examples, lots of regulations of entrepreneur-
ship apply only to entrepreneurs of certain legal nature or size (e.g. Italian Union
Laws or US health insurance in Kumar, Rajan & Zingales, 2001). Also, another
regulatory element which distorts the ”natural” forces behind creation of firms is
that lot of the regulation takes place on the market transactions and if these are
incorporated into the firm hierarchy, the entrepreneur may diminish the e↵ect of
the regulation. In a nutshell, firms may have much more freedom if they produce
something for themselves and if the quality of regulations is low, this e↵ect magnifies.
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The financial aspect of institutional setting is not of such an importance to our
analysis, the logic, however, is quite straightforward. More developed financial mar-
kets enable even more organisationally complex firms to obtain funding necessary
for their activities.
Other reasons why individuals organise themselves into firms are of less practical
importance but may yield some insight into how wide the range of motives may
be. For example, Hodgson (1991) views firm not only as unit minimising transac-
tion costs, but also protective enclave of evolutionary-emerged behavioural patterns
which could be destroyed by volatile market forces if not codified into a durable
organisational structure, but yield benefits to the entrepreneurs and society in the
long run. R. H. Coase in his classic Theory of the Firm (Coase, 1937) starts his
reasoning of why firms are formed with purely psychological and cultural aspects
- some people may enjoy governing others and responsibility, while others prefer
certainty and obeying orders. If we extend this argument, from the historical point
of view we may say it is in human nature to form organised groups. Organisational
patterns within society may therefore be of much more general extent than business
entities only and formation of firms may be driven by those more general phenomena
as well. As such reasoning may be useful to form a broader picture and set firms
formation into wider context, it does not yield any di↵erences for conclusions of our
analysis.
Much work has been done by economic geographers, that often goes hand in hand
with the theory. An example may be a paper by Michael Taylor and John Bryson
”Guns, Firms and Contracts: The Evolution of Gun-Making in Birmingham” which
examines in detail gun-making trade in Birmingham in the nineteenth century, where
direct pricing became ine cient because of technological changes and mass produc-
tion and therefore was gradually replaced by proxy pricing and many actors in
the former group contracting system became part of paid labour. The work shows
economic geographers may greatly help with understanding the processes of firm
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formation, but all the institutional and contractual details have to be taken into
account (Taylor & Oinas, 2006).
To conclude this section, we may note organisation of production within firms is
an alternative to the market processes guided by price signals. Within firms, there
is complete control, while markets are fluid and free (Shepherd & Shepherd, 2004).
Because of this, firms are set up so that the processes which can be more e ciently
performed internally are not subject of external market forces.
2.3 Firm size determination
When looking at real world examples of firms, it is staggering how much they di↵er
in their size and scope. Why does Microsoft operate in so many countries and
employs 128 000 people while the local baker never extends his operations beyond
local community? The answer lies in the balance of economies and diseconomies of
scale of various types and in various dimensions.
The relation between e ciency and size is one of the most serious prob-
lems of theory, being in contrast with the relation for a plant, largely a
matter of personality and historical accident rather than of intelligible
general principles...the possibility of monopoly gain o↵ers a powerful in-
centive to continuous and unlimited expansion of the firm, which force
must be o↵set by some equally powerful one making for decreased e -
ciency (in the production of money income) with growth in size, if even
boundary competition is to exist (Knight 2002, p.2)
It is important to realise the current state of firms is a result of the underlying firm
growth processes and needs to be treated accordingly. In some cases, it may have
not been driven by e ciency, but more likely by historical circumstances. Some
authors even view growth of firms as stochastic processes. The famous Gibrats Law
states that there is no relationship between the size of a firm and its growth (Gibrat,
1931), which means the firm sizes will not converge to any kind of optimum and are
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more or less random. However, such a sharp formulation of the Gibrats Law has
been fairly strongly empirically rejected (Santarelli, Klomp & Thurik, 2006). Still, it
is crucial to be aware that in some special circumstances the Gibrats Law may more
or less work. Therefore, the actual size of firms may tell us very little about what is
optimal and real world imperfect markets may be very slow to correct for ine cien-
cies. This is why it is necessary to study the actual state of firms confronted with
their performance in order to identify the real determinants of e cient boundaries
between market organisation and organisation within firms and their hierarchies.
We will go through views on size determination of firms of di↵erent approaches.
It is crucial to note those often do not contradict each other and are rather com-
plementary points of view on a more complex issue and in some cases even only
di↵erent ways of describing the same phenomena.
2.3.1 Classical framework
In the classical framework, firm size is a result of markets moving towards equilib-
rium. Because of competition, the profit maximising behaviour drives every firm
to most e cient size - where its average total costs (ATC) are the lowest (Martin,
2010). The ATC, when graphed with firm size, is thought to be U-shaped. At first,
economies of scale take place, and unitary costs diminish because the proportion of
fixed costs is lowered with more units produced. However, at some point, the unit
costs start to rise again (Scherer, 1972), e.g. because a bigger firm needs better paid
managers to run it or because the transportation costs occur (higher production
cannot be sold only locally because local demand is limited).
One underlying implication of this model is that the size of a market bounds the
e↵ective size of firms through the channel of possible degree of specialisation.
Another constraint is imposed on the ATC curve through the limits of human capi-
tal. One point of view on this e↵ect of human capital is that bigger firms using more
complex technologies and procedures need more skilled workers not only because of
the nature of their business, but also because mistakes are more costly for them
13




(Kremer, 1993). Another aspect may be that more skilled managers are needed
to run large organisations and only as big organisations as are manageable for the
management can exist (Rosen, 1982).
2.3.2 Transaction costs
Why there are two separate firms? Two reasons 1.Increasing cost for
each additional market transaction until cost of organizing marginal mar-
ket transaction was equal to marketing cost that of organization. 2.That
as transaction increased, might not carry out its object of reproducing
market conditions (Coase 1988, p.35)
The logic of determination of boundaries between firms from the point of view of
transaction costs is quite straightforward - whenever it is more e cient to carry
market transaction internally, the profit maximising behavior of a firm pushes for
this transaction to be performed within the firm. The scope of the firm broadens
until no such transactions remain.
This determination of boundaries may be easily demonstrated on a diagram. Imag-
ine that firms have only two organisational options - perform tasks internally or use
the market. Of course, some kind of mix of these options exists in the real world,
but such categorical distinction does not hurt the illustrativeness of this setting.
The production process within the firm can be described by the purchase of raw
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materials, di↵erent stages of productions where various componets are used and,
finally, distribution of the product.
Figure 2.3: transaction costs size determination
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Now if we take a look at the graph, it is clear every node can be easily included or
left out of the boundary of the firm, based on which option is profit-maximising,
e.g. the firm has two options about the first component needed in the first stage of
production - it may either produce it, or it may obtain it on the market. It may be
the case that it is really hard to determine the quality of the component when it is
already made, so the transaction costs of the market transaction are high and the
firm decides to produce it by itself. Another option is that the management of the
firm simply does not have the capacity to supervise production of the component
in a way so that it is produced in the most e cient manner, so the firm decides to
buy it on the market. If similar analysis is performed for every node of the graph,
a boundary of the firm is drawn and therefore even the size and scope of the firm is
determined.
One more transaction costs factor worth mentioning, which results in diseconomies
of scale, is the opportunistic behaviour. The incentives to shirk of employees are one
of the greatest challenges for management and monitoring costs are likely to increase
with increasing firm size and complexity (Cordes et al., 2008). Also, moving further
towards behavioural economics, it may be useful to take into account conflicting
interests of owners and managers of a firm. Some authors (Baumol, 1962; Marris,
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1965) explain why managers may expand the firms beyond what is e cient in terms
of profit maximisation in pursuing their own satisfaction and interests.
The implications of the transaction costs view are that well-functioning market with
little information asymmetry makes small businesses more e↵ective, while any tech-
nology which makes internal transactions more e↵ective (such as telephone, e-mail
or any other information technologies) should enable firms to become larger. Un-
fortunatelly, the implications of the transaction costs view are quite hard to verify
empirically, as many of the variables (such as information asymmetry) are hard to
measure or proxy (Kumar, Rajan & Zingales, 2001).
2.3.3 Networks
When thinking about the determinants of firm size, it may once again yield great
insight to think about firms in economy as networks and networks within networks.
No matter whether we take as the starting point for the network analysis individuals
or departments within a firm, the theory of networks provides some general impli-
cations which may be able to help to describe the forces driving firms to become
larger (or why they do not become larger).
First, implications of the theory of networks shed some new light on the traditional
view of economies of scale. It can be shown mathematically (Crama & Hammer,
2010) that possible stances in Boolean networks increase exponentially with more
nodes. This means that information value of any information processing network
increases exponentially as well. Also, this may mean exponential growth in com-
plexity of performed tasks as well as exponential growth in potential for novelty
with growing size which may be utilised e.g. in innovation. Therefore, economies of
scale may be much greater that those we know as a consequence of mass production
or specialisation, because larger interconnected units of human organisation are ca-
pable of much (exponentially) more complex tasks.
On the other side, the properties of Boolean networks give us some kind of guidance
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why growth in size and complexity of firms may fail to deliver e ciency. Complex
interconnected networks are prone to instability because changes in one part of the
network have strong influence on other parts of the network. This may lead to com-
plexity catastrophes, term used by Kau↵man (1993), when a positive change in one
place causes movements in the network resulting in a bad change somewhere else.
Beinhocker (2007) illustrates how these theoretical phenomena may translate into
practice on examples of decision-making processes between various departments of
a firm. If approval of other departments is needed for a move to be implemented
and this move influences other departments, which need to adjust accordingly to
wants of other departments, the decision-making becomes somehow engulfed in bu-
reaucracy. Because of the properties of Boolean networks, the complexity of this
decision-making process increases with the number of actors exponentially and in
the end, the big firm may not be able to adopt e cient decisions at all because of
the bureaucratic boundaries. Beinhocker uses example of the computer division of
IBM, which was not able to keep up with the trend of selling computers through
mail. Because of internal processes in IBM and its exclusive retail channels, even
though IBM most likely had superior sta↵ and experts to its rival Dell, it became
somehow cumbersome and did not keep up with the trends and eventually had to
sell its computer division.
Another implication of the theory of networks is that the organisational structure
matters. A lot of the above mentioned phenomena depend on how densely and ran-
domly the network is interconnected. Therefore, hierarchical structure may diminish
complexity catastrophes while threatening the potential of joint forces of di↵erent
employers/branches as well. Recognition of this fact may change the organisational
decisions of managers - e.g. General Eletrics gives its employees possibilities of
training programs in vastly di↵erent departments, and, on the other hand, in the
80s and 90s many corporations enabled more autonomy to di↵erent business units
with growth in size in order to lower the risks of complexity.
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2.3.4 Synthesis of the theories: multidimensional contradic-
tory forces
What is one key element that permeates through all of the above mentioned theo-
ries? It is that two opposing forces determine the size - one of e ciency of economies
of scale and the other one of problems connected with larger size and complexity.
These two forces can be easily graphed on a two axis diagram where Y axis stands
for the power of this force and X axis stands for firm size. Starting with the dis-
economies of scale, these start rather modestly, but increase with size as problems
with management, transportation costs etc. occur. Therefore, the curve represent-
ing these forces (DoS) will be upward sloping in firm size. A bit more complicated
case are the economies of scale as the network logic suggests it is not clear whether
these are upward or downward sloping. If we follow the logic of decreasing marginal
returns, this curve (EoS) will be downward slopping and our simple model will even-
tually reach equilibrium where the two curves intersect (if the economies of scale
curve is above the diseconomies of scale curve, the forces of economies of scale are
stronger and therefore drive the firm to grow. Similar logic applies for the opposite
case).





However, if the economies of scale curve is upward sloping, it may happen that the
two curves never intersect and the growth of the firm never stops. Nevertheless, this
is obviously purely theoretical example. In real world, the market is never infinite
and therefore, if nothing else, at some point the economies of scale start to diminish
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because there is no one to consume the additional production and the curves will
intersect at some point.
It is important to realise dozens of dimensions of organisational complexity are flat-
tened to one axis only and so are the various factors of (dis)economies of scale. This,
however, does not interfere with the basic implications of this schematic setting.
2.4 Implications for regulatory and legal frame-
work
Now that we have the broader theoretical background, we can move on to what
is central to our analysis - the institutional setting of government policies in the
form of legal and regulatory framework, which can be thought of as a little distinct
element of the problematic of transaction costs and is actually of great importance
in the real world.
If we move from a regime of zero transaction costs to one of positive
transaction costs, what becomes immediately clear is the crucial impor-
tance of the legal system in this new world. I explained in The Problem
of Social Cost that what are traded on the market are not, as is often
supposed by economists, physical entities, but the rights to perform cer-
tain actions, and the rights which individuals possess are established by
the legal system (Coase 2008, p.37)
2.4.1 Regulations
First aspect are the practical distortions imposed on firm boundaries by government
policies in the form of regulations. Any government subsidy deforms the market-
place in favour of those receiving it and deformed marketplace deforms what kind
of firms can cope with the competition (Carrizosa, 2006).
19
As lots of the distortive regulations have exemptions for small firms, firms are incen-
tivised to break up their activities and outsource what would otherwise be carried
internally. Bad regulations of entrepreneurship increase the overall costs of the or-
ganisation of production within firms, therefore, following the basic logic of Coase
(1937), it discourages growth of firms. There is a vast amount of literature which
describes this e↵ect and even tests it empirically in various circumstances (see e.g.
Thomas, 1990, Colbert & Murray, 1999, Laeven & Woodru↵, 2007, Ardagna &
Lusardi, 2008; Nystrm, 2008).
On the other side, bad regulations can be seen as fixed costs. If we take a look
at the neo-classical framework from graph 2.2, we can see that this increases the
optimal size of a firm, because larger firms can better cope with the fixed cost which
is distributed along larger volume of production (Bradford, 2004). Once again, even
this e↵ect has been empirically tested for and proved to exist in various circum-
stances (Klapper, Laeven & Rajan, 2006; Calcagno & Sobel, 2014).
2.4.2 Rule of Law
Overall quality of the legal framework has somehow conceptually similar e↵ects on
the transaction costs as regulations.
The quality of legal institutions is crucial for e ciency of contracting (mostly en-
forcement of the contracts). The practical implications of this are that with basic
respect to property rights, physical assets are protected, and therefore physical assets
intensive industries make it possible for firms to become larger. With further im-
provement of legal institutions even intangible assets such as property rights become
well-protected and firms that are more sensitive to intangible assets utilise economies
of scale as well (Kumar, Rajan & Zingales, 2001). Also, overall improvement of the
legal framework should enable firms to become more complex and broaden the scope
of their activities. Hand in hand with the classic transaction costs logic of Coase
(1937), better quality of legal institutions enables the central power to function in
more complex hierarchies.
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What is more, if the legal framework is subject to harsh and unpredictable changes,
it yields additional costs in predicting and interpreting the rules, which may dis-
courage firms from making more transactions and growth in complexity. Yi Man Li
(2008) illustrates this empirically on construction firms in Hong Kong and China.
In Hong Kong, construction firms provide many additional services to the core con-
struction business as a marketing strategy to attract potential buyers. This is possi-
ble because of rule of law which makes relationships with contractors and suppliers
smooth. On the other hand, in China, construction firms reduce the scope of their
activities as much as possible, as any additional contract yields risks of loses with
low enforceability and predictability of changes in law (Yi Man Li, 2008).
On the other side, low enforceability of contracts may have also the opposite ef-
fect on size of the firms, as the institutional view advocates. As market transactions
become more expensive because of higher monitoring and bargaining costs, the trans-
action cost logic motivates firms to carry these transactions internally. This may
simulate especially vertical integration and with diminishing the benefits of market
e ciency lead to larger firms. Once again, this e↵ect has been demonstrated both
theoretically and empirically (Pascali, 2009), for example on the emerging market
of India compared to the US (Khanna & Palepu, 2000).
2.4.3 Predictive implications of the theory
When looking back at the diagram from section 2.3.4, the theory does not give a
definite answer to the question to what extent (or whether at all) the quality of reg-
ulations and rule of law will be included in the economies of scale curve and to what
extent in the diseconomies of scale one. Both for the regulations and rule of law the
theory predicts qualitatively contradictory e↵ects, and the quantitative aggregate is
hard to be predicted. Therefore, the implications of the theoretical framework for
forming real world policies in this area remain very limited and the matter remains
to be rather an empirical issue. Much of the work previously mentioned yields quan-
titative empirical answers, but these are subject to conditions of these studies and
21





The framework from section 2 proposes an economic model which can be easily for-
malised.
firm size = f(rule of law, quality of regulations, ...) (3.1)
Firm size can be thought of as a function of level of rule of law, quality of regulatory
framework and other variables, but the exact functional relationship is unknown.
What is central to our analysis is whether this function is decreasing or increasing
in these two variables.
@ f(rule of law, quality of regulations, ...)
@ rule of law
S 0 (3.2)
@ f(rule of law, quality of regulations, ...)
@ quality of regulations
S 0 (3.3)
Lets proceed to converting this economic model into econometric model.
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3.1.1 Finding the best econometric model
Now is the time to utilise the broad framework from previous chapters on deter-
minants of firm size. The borderline is there are many di↵erent factors which have
to be taken into account and, as noted in section 2.3.2, some of them may be ex-
tremely hard to measure or proxy. These may include e.g. information asymmetry
in negotiations for contracts, smoothing of internal communication within a firm
with development of information technologies, or the psychological and behavioural
aspects. However, many of the factors mentioned in the preceding chapters which
are nearly impossible to measure, are likely to be correlated with rule of law and
quality of regulations. This means that if simple linear regression model was used,
omitted variable bias would arise, and we would face substantial endogeneity. Of
course, it is hard to predict whether this endogeneity would lead to false conclusions
of our analysis, and how much it would alter the results, but based on the theory,
this problem is likely to be of a great importance and cannot be ignored.
What do all these unmeasurable factors have in common? They are often results of
cultural factors and behavioural patterns deeply rooted within the society. Because
of that, we assume these factors evolve slowly and can be thought of as fixed for the
purpose of our analysis. This naturally brings us to the fixed e↵ects model which
can treat for our unobserved heterogeneity.
In fixed e↵ects model it is crucial to identify the factors which cannot be treated as
fixed and these are mainly macroeconomic variables which change on annual basis
and obviously influence decisions about firm size. When looking into other empiri-
cal literature (see e.g. Calcagno & Sobel, 2013), it seems that unemployment rate
and real per capita income could be su cient. Other important factors such as
proportion of people living in urban areas, size of population, age distribution in
population, education distribution in population or structure of the economy evolve
rather slowly over time and therefore may be included in the (country, industry,
society, firm) fixed e↵ect.
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This reasoning leads to model in the form of
yit = x
0
it  + ai + uit (3.4)
where ai is the unobserved heterogeneity fixed over time (composed of elements on
di↵erent levels - country, society, industry and firm), yit is size of firm i in time t,
uit is the idiosyncratic error, and xit is the vector of explanatory variables including
rule of law, quality of regulations, and other factors which change over time.
Also, because of the conflicting predictions of the theory it seems that functional
relationship between rule of law, or quality of regulations and firm size may be
rather complicated, and simple linear relationship could not be su cient if dynamic
relationships were actually of a very nonlinear nature, because the worse fit of the
model could cover some less significant relationships. On the other side, as we are
interested in general nature of the phenomena, it seems that quadratic functional
form should be su cient as the starting point.
We include the log form of the firm size, the model has better interpretative value as
the proportional change in size is more natural measure of the e↵ect, so our proposed
model (for two-period panel data) is
log(yit) =  0 +  0dPt +  1RLit +  2RL
2
it +  3RQit +  4RQ
2
it
+ 5GDPit +  6UNit + ai + uit, t = 1, 2.
(3.5)
where RL is rule of law, RQ quality of egulations, GDP real per capita income, UN
unemployment rate, ai is the unobserved heterogeneity fixed over time, yit is size of
firm i in time t, dP stands for dummy variable for the initial time period and uit is
the idiosyncratic error.
3.1.2 Estimation method
If we used standard OLS with pooled cross sections, the estimates would su↵er
from the omitted variable bias described above. Will first-di↵erence estimator yield
satisfactory results? The drawback of first-di↵erencing is the reduced variation in
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explanatory variables. But as both rule of law and quality of regulation somehow
dynamically evolve and our other explanatory variables were chosen because of the
time dynamics they contain (otherwise would be left in the fixed e↵ect), it seems
that with large enough sample the variation in the data should not be a big issue.
Even though it may diminish the statistical significance of the results, it seems the
benefits overweight the risk of bias of standard OLS.
Are all the assumptions for valid statistical inference under first di↵erences ful-
filled? We may assume the functional form fits and same sample with variance and
no perfect collinearity will be assured if the dataset is chosen properly.
Also, if the logic from section 3.1.1 stands, the expected value of the idiosyncratic
error is not influenced by the explanatory variables as the problematic factors were
left out in the fixed e↵ect term, and the explanatory variables are intuitively gener-
ated outside of our model, so simultaneity shall not be an issue either. However, we
need to be careful about sample selection issues when operating with the data.
Therefore, the assumptions for first-di↵erence estimator to yield unbiased results
are likely to be met. We still need to remain suspicious about possible heteroscedas-
ticity and serial correlation, as these could invalidate our statistical inference if not
tested for (and eventually corrected for).
3.1.3 How to measure firm size
Looking back at section 2.1 where we showed how complex phenomenon firm is, it
raises natural concerns about the measurement of its size. As the size of a firm is
central to our analysis, the problem of the measurement deserves careful considera-
tion.
Very little could be achieved empirically without the assumption that legal entity
is a good proxy for a firm as a production unit from the point of view of economics
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and the length of its production process. It is intuitively natural that more complex
production process is connected with larger legal entity. Authors in the field usually
follow this logic (see e.g. Kumar, Rajan & Zingales, 2001). However, we need to
be careful in interpreting the results if legal entity is used as a proxy for firm in
the economic sense because it is obvious the legal entity is directly influenced by
changes in the legal framework, and it is questionable whether these changes neces-
sarily smoothly translate into the real nature and scope of the firm itself. All such
concerns need to be reflected on case by case basis, and all the findings need to be
treated accordingly.
Still, even as the legal entity is taken as a good representation of a firm, it re-
mains to be decided what kind of indicator of the size to use. Davidsson, Delmar
& Wiklund (2006) summarised some of the most often used indicators of firm size
and growth in firm size. These include number of employees, market value of a
firm and indicators connected with production (revenues, value of production, sales,
added value of production, etc). It may be argued each of them may be optimal in
di↵erent research circumstances and purposes, however, as Correa (1999) notes, the
authors often choose the indicator according to the kind of data they have. This
is possible because these indicators are highly correlated, as various research has
shown (see e.g. Kirchho↵ & Norton, 1994 or Carrizosa, 2006). It does not mean
the choice of the indicator should be random, because interpretation of what all of
these indicators measure di↵ers slightly.
We need to have on our mind our goal is to measure internal economic activity
in the firm. This is why it may be a good idea to omit indicators which may be
directly influenced by monetary changes (such as exchange rate adjustment or in-
flation) even if those do not translate in the real workings of the economy. Because
of this, indicators connected with both sales and revenues may not provide accurate
information about the nature and scope of the activities within a firm (Delmar,
Davidsson & Gartner, 2003).
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On the other side, Penrose (2009) identifies number of employees as a suitable in-
dicator of firm size if the managerial implications of the size matter. Number of
employees is not subject to the problems mentioned earlier and arguably directly
shows the organisational complexity. Also, it is widely and most commonly used in
papers dealing with the firm size (Kimberly, 1976).
Even though number of employees seems to be a good proxy for firm size, it is
important to be careful of its limitations. As Delmar, Davidsson & Gartner (2003)
mention, the drawbacks of number of employees as firm size indicator may be that
it does not reflect increases in labour productivity and the substitution of workforce
by machines. Also, it does not provide information about the degree of integration.
This does not mean it is not a good proxy for firm size, but results of analysis with
number of employees as a firm size indicator need to be treated accordingly with
these limitations. What is more, the high correlation with other possible indicators
remains, so the explanatory power of the analysis is likely to be similar as if more
indicators were used (see Hart, 2000).
3.1.4 Measuring rule of law and quality of regulations
There are two general ways in which to asses quality of legal framework and regu-
lations - some authors prefer to use easily measurable distinct variables as proxies
while others use indices which are often a result of a complex and complicated
methodology, which aggregates various indicators and data sources.
As an example of some of the simple indicators (even though for a little bit dif-
ferent kind of indicator than we need), Campbell, Heriot & Jauregui (2010) use
expenditures on regulatory inspections as a proxy for regulation burden, because
these should reflex both new legislative and harder pressure on compliance. Mulli-
gan & Shleifer (2005) proxy state regulation with volume of all statutes. Surveys
between managers have been used as a measure of regulatory quality, and similar
examples can be found in empirical literature for proxies of rule of law as well.
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These indicators are conceptually clear and somehow easy to interpret, however,
they may not be able to capture the whole scope of various regulatory and legal
influences (Falkenhall & Eklund, 2010). Because of this, complex indices assessing
many di↵erent categories and combining various data sources may be more success-
ful in comparison of di↵erent countries (Botero & Ponce, 2010). Obvious drawback
is connected with the complexity - the methodology of construction of an index must
be taken into account while interpreting the results.
As we are interested in showing quite general phenomena, it could harm the re-
sults if we used very specific indicator which may not cover all the factors about
both rule of law and regulatory framework, and therefore using indices constructed
by international organisations such as World Bank or OECD seems to be more con-
venient.
3.2 Data
In this section, we start with describing individual data sources used in our analysis
and conclude with description of the resulting dataset.
3.2.1 BEEPS
The Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) is a re-
sult of joint e↵ort of the World Bank and European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD) in collecting panel firm-level data of firms in former soviet
countries. The main goal is to gather information about business development and
environment for private enterprise.
The idea of the survey is to use fixed representative sample of economys private
sector. So far, the firms were surveyed 5 times (1999-2000, 2002, 2004-2005, 2008-
2009, 2011-2014). Private contractors gather the information about the statistically
chosen firms in face-to-face interviews with business owners or top managers with
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the promise of confidentiality in order to assure as high participation (and therefore
low selection sample bias) as possible. The questionnaire is rather complex, for the
5th round, it included around 400 questions.
The panel data nature of BEEPS is problematic because of two reasons - only a
fraction of firms has been actually surveyed in all 5 rounds, and the methodology of
the survey has been improved after each of the rounds. Therefore, the results from
individual rounds are to be directly compared only with a great caution. Because of
this fact, we use only the V round of BEEPS. It does not mean we lose the panel-
data nature of our dataset. For some of the questions, managers and owners are not
surveyed only for the current state but also for the state 3 years ago. Therefore, we
may construct two-period panel dataset, using the most recent round of the survey
only.
In BEEPS V, total number of 15 883 establishments of firms had been surveyed.
The information about number of full-time employees (which we use as a proxy for
firm size) is missing for 105 observations, and the information about number of full-
time employees 3 years ago is missing for 1910 observations. At this point, we need
to address concerns about sample selection bias. There are two major reasons why
the information on number of employees 3 years ago is missing.
First, in some cases, BEEPS simply failed to obtain this information probably be-
cause managers and owners did not know it or did not want to provide it. When
looking into other characteristics of these firms, there does not seem to be any sig-
nificant systematic di↵erence compared to the rest of the sample (speaking of means
and standard errors of other variables), and even intuitively the ability of managers
and owners to provide this information should not be correlated with the firm size.
Second, some of the firms simply did not exist 3 years ago. Jugging from the infor-
mation about the year when the establishments started its operations, this is the case
for 917 observations which is 5.77% of our sample size. Now the situation is quite
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di↵erent than in the first case, but the problems of the possible sample selection bias
may be overcome by careful interpretation of the results. We do not have random
sample on all firms, but we may have a random sample from di↵erent population -
that is established firms farther from the boundary of timeframe of their existence.
If we assume the creation and destruction of firms is not consequence of the forces
determining firm size only (which is surely to hold in the real world), focus on firms
that are not newly established or in the process of destruction will actually yield
more insight on the forces which determine size of firms in non-extreme existential
conditions. Other side of this coin is the non-randomness in the ”selection” of firms
for the initial time period (3 years ago), because some of the firms may have gone
out of the business and therefore were not selected, even though they would have
been selected into the sample otherwise. Same logic as before follows for this case
as well. The borderline is we need to be careful while interpreting the results, as
the estimates will be valid for population of firms far away from establishment and
extinction, and some special circumstances not covered by our sample may arise in
these special time periods.
The original BEEPS V dataset includes 30 countries, however, in our analysis, we
exclude Kosovo. Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia as recently as in
2008, therefore its institutional climate is hardly revealing speaking of typical post-
soviet countries, and many institutions are still being established. Because of these
geopolitical di↵erences, there is a chance inclusion of Kosovo in the dataset would
rather contaminate it for the purpose of our analysis.
3.2.2 Worldwide Governance Indicators
The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) is a set of indices on perception of
governance constructed by World Bank from 31 various underlying data sources,
ranging from various surveys to expert assessments (Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi,
2010). We use 2 of the total 6 indices included in WGI - Rule of Law and Regulatory
Quality.
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The Rule of Law index measures perceptions of contracts enforcement e ciency,
workings of courts, level of protection of property rights, but also probability of
violence and crime. These particular indicators show overall confidence in the rules
and their enforcement in the given country. Regulatory quality index measures per-
ception of the ability of government to formulate and implement regulations which
promote private sector development.
It is important to note that the WGI indices reflect the perception of the variables
we are interested in more than measure them directly, therefore, in our analysis,
these indices need to be treated as proxies of real rule of law and regulatory quality.
3.2.3 World Bank macroeconomic indicators
Set of macroeconomic variables used in our analysis is based on indicators avail-
able in the World Bank database (http://data.worldbank.org/). The source of the
indicators used are World Bank national accounts, OECD National Accounts and
International Labour Organisation. For codes of the individual indicators and more
information, please see Appendix a.
3.2.4 Dataset
The WGI and WB data were matched with the original BEEPS V dataset along
countries and years. The result is a two-period panel data dataset with informa-
tion on 13781 establishments in 29 countries. These include Albania, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic,
Estonia, Macedonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania,
Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovak Republic,
Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. The description and sum-
mary statistics of the most important characteristics of the variables used can be
found in the following table:
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Table 3.1: description of variables and summary statistics of the dataset
Variable Description Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
EMP number of employees EMPt 65,397 267,182 1,000 1100,000
RL rule of law index estimate EMPt3 62,039 253,243 0,000 1150,000
RQ regulatory quality index estimate dEMP 3,029 53,554 -1242,000 215,000
GDP GDP per capita (in 2005 US $) RLt -0,332 0,632 -1,414 1,160
UN unemployment rate (in %) RLt3 -0,381 0,649 -1,317 1,091
dRL 0,049 0,092 -0,143 0,165
RQt 0,016 0,635 -1,584 1,390
Variation Explanation RQt3 0,001 0,645 -1,492 1,407
dVAR (VAR today) - (VAR 3 years ago)* dRQ 0,015 0,073 -0,243 0,144
VARt VAR today GDPt 6014,604 3782,946 437,222 19404,000
VARt3 VAR 3 years ago dGDP 5,165 7,059 -3,960 21,273
lVAR log(VAR) UNt 10,518 5,664 4,800 31,000
VARsq VAR squared dUN 0,292 2,016 -4,200 6,000
Summary statistics:Variables description:
Variables variations:
*only for GDP we use dGDP as a cummulative % change in GDP per capita in the 3 years insted of the absolute change
More detailed description of some of the variables and their sources is included in
the Appendix a.
3.2.5 Possible problems of our dataset
The biggest threat to our analysis seems to be relatively high correlation between
our 2 key explanatory variables. The correlation between RL and RQ in both of the
time periods is 0.93. This actually is not a surprise as both are likely to be deter-
mined by similar phenomena. However, the usage of first di↵erencing and therefore
focus on dynamics should help to solve this issue. The correlation between dRL and
dRQ is only 0.26, which should not be an issue in such a large dataset.
Another thing is the relatively low variation some of our variables show over the
two time periods. Because of this fact we need to be aware it is possible the signif-
icance levels of our findings will not be high. On the other side, the large amount
of observations in our dataset should help, and therefore it still seems the lower
variance is a bearable cost of first di↵erencing compared to the possible endogeneity
and multicollinearity if first di↵erencing were not used.
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The global financial crisis may have had influence on our data as the final dataset re-
flects the period 2007-2012 and many of the countries of our focus had gone through
recessions at some point during this period. This is something that probably in-
creases volatility and diversity of economic conditions in our data, which should
help us study the dynamic e↵ects (it is possible the variance in the data would be
lower for other time periods). On the other side, we should be aware of the fact the
economic conditions during those years may have been somehow specific.
3.3 Results and discussion
The following table summarizes results of fixed e↵ects estimate of the model pro-
posed in section 3.1.1. As homoscedasticity was soundly rejected by the Breusch-
Pagan test, the reported results use robust standard errors.
As can be seen in the table, all the variables of our interest turned out to be statis-
Table 3.2: Regression of dlEMP on dRQ, dRQsq, dRL, dRLsq, dGDP, dUNRegression of dlEMP on dRQ, dRQsq, dRL, dRLsq, dGDP, dUN
Robust
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t
dRQ 0,470 0,058 8,140 0,000
dRQsq 0,787 0,368 2,140 0,033
dRL -0,062 0,074 -0,850 0,397
dRLsq 2,121 0,564 3,760 0,000
dGDP -0,003 0,001 -3,970 0,000
dUN -0,017 0,002 -8,500 0,000
_cons 0,062 0,009 7,100 0,000
Observations: 13769 R-squared: 0,02
tically significant in the regression even at the 5% significance level (the P value of
the linear change in rule of law indicator is 0.397, but it is jointly significant at the
5% significance level with the variable in the squared form). This may suggest that
the variance in the sample we have is su cient for statistical inference and that our
logic of the construction of the model was correct.
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Starting with the control variables, the sign on di↵erenced unemployment rate sug-
gests that decreasing unemployment rate is connected with increasing number of
employees of firms which is what would be intuitively expected and in accordance
with other empirical studies. As a bit of a surprise may come the sign on di↵erenced
GDP per capita. However, interpretation of GDP growth with other factors equal
(including unemployment) may be contra-intuitive, as GDP growth is (in the real
world) connected with overly improving economic conditions (because these are, for
a big part, jointly determined with GDP growth). Also, the financial crisis con-
nected with recessions may have had an e↵ect on the influence of GDP growth on
firm size. Possible explanation may be in the creative destruction process connected
with mergers and acquisitions in recessions. This hypotheses, however, would need
more investigation and remains open for future research. The important thing for
our analysis is that these factors are controlled for and therefore do not contaminate
the results on the two variables of our focus.
Another thing that deserves commentary is low value of the R-squared statistic.
If we take a look at the micro perspective of the determination of growth of size of a
firm, we see that many everyday situations and hardly predictable factors come into
the decision-making of the managers. From the viewpoint of the manager, the deci-
sion to hire one more worker is a result of rather organic observation of surrounding
environment of the firm and very bounded-rationality lead predictions about its fu-
ture development. Therefore, it is no surprise our model is not able to explain major
part of the variation in the changes of number of employees. But that is actually
not something we are trying to do in this empiricall setting - the goal of our analysis
is to capture the e↵ects (and their magnitude) of rule of law and regulations, not to
explain the size of firms. Such a very low value of R-squared yields an important
insight - even though we can statistically prove there is an e↵ect of level of rule of
law, quality of regulations and our controls, we can see these explain very little part
of the variation in changes in the number of employees, so the economic significance
of these factors for firm sizes is not likely to be high (even though this is, of course,
relative). Also, it is important to realise we use the fixed e↵ect estimation, and
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we di↵erence out many of the important factors, therefore the interpretation of the
R-squared statistic is limited, and the original model, where the fixed e↵ects are
included, is likely to explain much greater part of the variation, even though the
fixed e↵ects were not subject of our estimation.
3.3.1 E↵ect of rule of law and quality of regulations
Moving on to the two variables of our interest, the following graph summarizes the
estimated e↵ect of changes in the logs of rule of law and regulations quality indica-
tors on change in number of employees of a firm.
Figure 3.1: Estimated e↵ects of changes in RQ and RQ on change in logs of number
of employees









The vertical axis represents change in the number of employees (in tens), while the
horizontal one change in the value of the given index. The curves “RQ” and “RL”
are the estimated functional relationships between dlEMP and dRQ (respectively
dRL). The functions are grpahed only in the range of standard deviation from mean
in the distributions of dRL (dRQ), because the estimated functions are not likely
to be good representation of the population relationships outside of these bound-
aries, as we do not have many observations with coresponding values. It seems that
dlEMPL is increasing in dRQ. On the other side, the e↵ect of dRL seems to be of
more complex nature. However, it is not possible to provide valid statistical infer-
ence about the exact shape of the curves as the functional relations are estimates
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only, and estimates of both the linear and quadratic componets have substantial
standard errors. But if we reestimate the model with exlusion of the quadratics, we
obtain somehow conclusive results for the general direction of the e↵ect of RQ.
Table 3.3: Regression of dlEMP on dRQ, dRL, dGDP, dUNRegression of dlEMP on dRQ, dRL, dGDP, dUN
Robust
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t
dRQ 0,403 0,050 8,000 0,000
dRL 0,092 0,056 1,660 0,098
dGDP -0,004 0,001 -5,450 0,000
dUN -0,018 0,002 -9,000 0,000
_cons 0,088 0,007 12,450 0,000
Observations: 13769 R-squared: 0,01
As can be seen in the table, the results of this auxiliary regression correspond to
those of the first one for RQ. We have strong evidence of positive e↵ect of positive
changes in RQ, while the original model is inconclusive about the exact nature of
the influence of RL. The shape of the curve suggests that changes in RL, no matter
whether positive or negative, incentivise firm growth, or, because of the distribution
of our observation, it may seem that there is no or very little e↵ect unless there is
su cient positive increase in RL, when dlEMP starts to increse in dRL. However,
the e↵ect is less significant in both statistical and economic terms, and we should
wait for the sensitivity analysis for interpretation.
Because of the nature of our model and our data, it would not make much sense to
look for quantitative interpretation of the estimation. This is because the values of
the indices on rule of law and regulatory quality do not have a good quantitative
interpretation either. They are constructed in such a manner so that it is possible to
make comparisons between di↵erent time periods and between di↵erent countries.
Therefore, it is the sign of the coe cients rather than the absolute size what mat-
ters. For an idea about the magnitude of the e↵ect, we can take look at it in the
terms of standard deviation. One standard deviation increase in RQ is connected
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with predicted growth in firm size of nearly 5 %, which can be considered as highly
economically significant e↵ect.
3.3.2 Sensitivity analysis
We now provide some alternations in our original model to see whether any of the
important conclusions will change. Namely, we use change in the levels as the de-
pendent variable instead of log form and also di↵erent polynomial forms of the dRL
and dRQ - polynomials of degree 3, 2 and 1.
Figure 3.2: Estimated e↵ects of RQ and RL with various functional forms








































Figure 3.2 presents graphed estimates of the 6 resulting models. For each of the
graph, one form of the dependent variable and one of the explanatory variables are
chosen, and curves representing the functional relationships for all of the 3 func-
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tional forms of the explanatory variable are graphed in one graph. For clarity, we
note that all the axes still refer to di↵erences. The distinction is in whether those are
di↵erences in levels or di↵erences in logs. The curves labelled “1” represent linear
relationship, those labeled “2” polynomial of degree 2 and these labeled “3” polyno-
mial of degree 3. Detailed tables of parameters and statistics from the 6 regressions
are to be found in Appendix b.
Because we estimate the relations of the di↵erences, rather than relations between
specific levels of the variables, experiments with various functional form of the ex-
planatory variables have very limited interpretation as well, and may be useful only
because some of the qualitative information may become statistically significant with
functional form more suitable for the actual data. Only if the functional relationship
in the range, where most of the observations are located, was of rapidly nonlinear
nature, could polynomial functional relationship of higher degree unveil qualitative
mismatch of the direction of the e↵ect, but this is obviously not the case for our
data; it can be seen in the graphs that di↵erent functional forms of explanatory
variables do not bring any qualitative di↵erences into the analysis.
Using number of employees instead of log does not alter any qualitative results
of the analysis for RQ. Quite the contrary, the results look rather similar and what
is more, all the functional forms of RQ are still highly statistically significant, there-
fore, the sensitivity analysis only strengthens the implications made in section 3.3.1.
On the other side, when looking at the results of rule of law, there is something
to worry about. There is qualitative di↵erence between the direction of the e↵ect
changes in rule of law have on size of firms. Moreover, the significance of the e↵ect of
rule of law is not that high - in regression with the linear term only, P value for dRL
is 0.06, joint significance in the other two regressions of terms including dRL is high,
but the individual components are sometimes not that clear, see Appendix b). There
are two possible reasons why the results of the estimations are uncovering about the
e↵ect of rule of law. Firstly, it may be that the variance in the data connected with
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correlation between explanatory variables turns out to be insu cient to prove the
exact nature of the relation, which is not strong enough to emerge in this setting.
However, there is one more possibility - the functional relation between rule of law
and firm size may be of such a nature that our model is not capable of uncovering
it. If the relationship is vastly di↵erent for di↵erent levels of both firm size and rule
of law, the focus on di↵erences may not be able to detect it properly. Our estimates
actually provide some kind of evidence that the functional relationship may be of a
more complicated nature. The correct explanation will probably be somewhere in
between of those two. Therefore, our analysis does not bring definite conclusion on
the relation between rule of law and firm size in the post-soviet countries. However,




Firm size determination is extremely complex phenomenon with many di↵erent fac-
tors involved, and its study may yield important implications for policy-making and
understanding of the economy. Throughout the theoretical part, we build broad
framework of di↵erent views on the di↵erent factors involved in this process, fo-
cusing on the institutional factors of regulatory quality and rule of law. For both
quality of regulations and rule of law, the theory provides contradictory arguments
on what kind of e↵ect should these have on changes of boundaries of firms.
The main arguments are that bad institutional quality makes on one side the in-
ternal transactions more costly and therefore incentivizes firms to perform these on
markets, but on the other worsens the functioning of markets as well, and therefore
there is also contradictory incentive to use market transactions less and extend the
boundary of the firm. The theory cannot provide definite answer on where this e↵ect
is stronger and what the overall relationship between regulatory quality and rule of
law and firm size is.
In the empirical part, we examine the e↵ect of regulatory quality and rule of law on
two-period panel data on post-soviet countries from eastern Europe and Asia from
years 2007 to 2012. Because of the complex nature of the problem, we examine the
dynamics in fixed e↵ect model - the factors which would be hard to control for are
usually of a long-term nature, and therefore can be di↵erenced out. This approach
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also provides better image of the current situation of the post-soviet countries, as the
actual state may be more of a result of historic circumstances than actual current
determinants of firm size.
We find out that improvements in the quality of regulations are connected with
growth of firms. The most novel aspect of our study is the focus on post-soviet
countries where the firms face specific economic conditions, and therefore it is hard
to predict (from the theoretical point of view) whether the relations uncovered on
data from western Europe and US will hold. The same qualitative e↵ect of reg-
ulatory e↵ectiveness as found in our study has been described in countries of the
developed world or upper-middle income developing countries. The quantitative ef-
fect is hardly comparable because the methodologies and focus of di↵erent studies
di↵er significantly. Therefore, it seems that the special conditions of post-soviet
countries do not a↵ect this element in determination of firm size and firm growth.
On the other side, our analysis is inconclusive on the e↵ects of quality of legal
framework in the form of rule of law. It seems the e↵ect is of somehow more com-
plex nature and not as much significant as the e↵ect of quality of regulations. Due
to this, the examination of di↵erences over time may not yield su cient insight.
Further research using di↵erent methodology and data is therefore needed to un-
cover whether in this case the specifics of post-soviet countries make any di↵erence.
Also, as regulatory quality and firm size explain only little part of the determination
of firm size and its growth, the field of study of firm size yields many other oppor-
tunities for future research. For example, the e↵ect of development of information
technologies on the e↵ectiveness of internal transactions and monitoring processes
is yet to be empirically examined. All the information on firm size determination
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Appendix a
More information on the used dataset is to be found in this appendix.
BEEPS questions
Firstly, we provide exact wording from the BEEPS questionnaires on number of
employees used to construct variable EMPt and EMPt3.
Question L.1
“At the end of fiscal year [insert last complete fiscal year], how many
permanent, full-time individuals worked in this establishment? Please
include all employees and managers (INTERVIEWER: INCLUDE IN-
TERVIEWEE IF APPLICABLE).
(Permanent, full-time employees are defined as all paid employees that
are contracted for a term of one or more fiscal years and/or have a guar-
anteed renewal of their employment contract and that work full-time)”
Question L.2
“Three fiscal years ago, at the end of fiscal year [insert three complete
fiscal years ago], how many permanent, full-time individuals worked in
this establishment? Please include all employees and managers. (IN-
TERVIEWER: INCLUDE INTERVIEWEE IF APPLICABLE).”




The exact definitions of the WGI indicators we use are following:
Regulatory Quality (RQ) capturing perceptions of the ability of the
government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations
that permit and promote private sector development...
... Rule of Law (RL) capturing perceptions of the extent to which
agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in par-
ticular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police,
and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.
(Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2010)
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WB macroeconomic indicators
Table 4.1: information on the WB macroeconomic indicators used in the analysis
(World Bank, 2015)
variable 









Unemployment refers to the share of the labor 





Key Indicators of 
the Labour 
Market database.
gdp NY.GDP.MKTP.KD GDP (constant 2005 US$)
GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross 
value added by all resident producers in the 
economy plus any product taxes and minus any 
subsidies not included in the value of the 
products. It is calculated without making 
deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or 
for depletion and degradation of natural 
resources. Data are in constant 2005 U.S. dollars. 
Dollar figures for GDP are converted from 
domestic currencies using 2000 official exchange 
rates. For a few countries where the official 
exchange rate does not reflect the rate effectively 
applied to actual foreign exchange transactions, 
an alternative conversion factor is used.
World Bank 
national accounts 







Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market 
prices based on constant local currency. 
Aggregates are based on constant 2005 U.S. 
dollars. GDP is the sum of gross value added by 
all resident producers in the economy plus any 
product taxes and minus any subsidies not 
included in the value of the products. It is 
calculated without making deductions for 
depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion 
and degradation of natural resources.
World Bank 
national accounts 





GDP per capita 
(constant 2005 
US$)
GDP per capita is gross domestic product 
divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum 
of gross value added by all resident producers in 
the economy plus any product taxes and minus 
any subsidies not included in the value of the 
products. It is calculated without making 
deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or 
for depletion and degradation of natural 
resources. Data are in constant 2005 U.S. dollars.
World Bank 
national accounts 





More dataset summary statistics
Some other characteristics of the variables in the dataset used for the final analysis,
which were not carefully described in the text.
Table 4.2: dataset summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
year* 2010.782 .522358 2010 2012
*last completed fiscal year before the survey took place
Correlation RLt RQt ................................... 0.9330
Correlation RLt3 RQt3 ................................... 0.9271
Correlation dRQ dRL ................................... 0.2558
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Appendix b
Detailed information on all regressions is to be found in this appendix.
Figure 4.1: Estimated e↵ects of changes in RQ and RQ on change in number of
employees (similar as figure 3.1 but for EMP in levels instead of logs)










dRQ - std. dev.
dRL - mean
dRL - std. dev.
The vertical axis represents change in the number of employees (in tens) while the
horizontal one change in the value of the given index. The curves “RQ” and “RL”
are the estimated functional relationships between dEMP and dRQ (respectively
dRL). While interpreting the shape of the curves, it is important to know about the
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actual distributions of the changes in indexes, therefore the dashed and dotted lines
show the mean and standard deviation around it for both dRQ and dRL. As vast
majority of the observations lies within those boundaries, the estimated functions
are not likely to be a good representation of the relations outside of those, therefore
we may ignore the exponential increases of the curves beyond those. This figure
is analogous to figure 3.1, but di↵erence in levels of number of employees is used
instead of di↵erence in logs and also the whole curves are graphed, even though the
accuracy of the representation of the real functional relationship is not likely to be
high outside of the boundaries of standard deviations from mean of the observations.
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Regression of dlEMP on dRQ, dRQsq, dRQtr, dRL, dRLsq, dRLtr, dGDP, dUN
Robust
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
dRQ 0,886 0,114 7,760 0,000 0,662 1,110
dRQsq -1,856 0,821 -2,260 0,024 -3,465 -0,246
dRQtr -19,298 4,955 -3,890 0,000 -29,010 -9,586
dRL -0,088 0,116 -0,750 0,452 -0,316 0,141
dRLsq 3,393 0,808 4,200 0,000 1,810 4,977
dRLtr -9,006 7,078 -1,270 0,203 -22,879 4,867
dGDP -0,002 0,001 -3,090 0,002 -0,004 -0,001
dUN -0,012 0,002 -5,240 0,000 -0,017 -0,008
_cons 0,061 0,009 7,100 0,000 0,044 0,078
Observations: 13769 R-squared: 0,02
Regression of dlEMP on dRQ, dRQsq, dRL, dRLsq, dGDP, dUN
Robust
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
dRQ 0,470 0,058 8,140 0,000 0,357 0,583
dRQsq 0,787 0,368 2,140 0,033 0,065 1,509
dRL -0,062 0,074 -0,850 0,397 -0,207 0,082
dRLsq 2,121 0,564 3,760 0,000 1,016 3,226
dGDP -0,003 0,001 -3,970 0,000 -0,004 -0,001
dUN -0,017 0,002 -8,500 0,000 -0,021 -0,013
_cons 0,062 0,009 7,100 0,000 0,045 0,079
Observations: 13769 R-squared: 0,02
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Regression of dlEMP on dRQ, dRL, dGDP, dUN
Robust
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
dRQ 0,403 0,050 8,000 0,000 0,304 0,501
dRL 0,092 0,056 1,660 0,098 -0,017 0,201
dGDP -0,004 0,001 -5,450 0,000 -0,005 -0,003
dUN -0,018 0,002 -9,000 0,000 -0,022 -0,014
_cons 0,088 0,007 12,450 0,000 0,074 0,102
Observations: 13769 R-squared: 0,01
Regression of dEMP on dRQ, dRQsq, dRQtr, dRL, dRLsq, dRLtr, dGDP, dUN
Robust
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
dRQ 70,07 11,50 6,09 0,00 47,52 92,61
dRQsq -48,89 85,21 -0,57 0,57 -215,91 118,13
dRQtr -1835,85 504,57 -3,64 0,00 -2824,89 -846,82
dRL -34,07 16,46 -2,07 0,04 -66,33 -1,81
dRLsq 212,02 95,09 2,23 0,03 25,64 398,41
dRLtr -210,22 1207,49 -0,17 0,86 -2577,07 2156,63
dGDP -0,09 0,10 -0,91 0,37 -0,27 0,10
dUN -0,37 0,30 -1,21 0,23 -0,96 0,23
_cons 2,05 1,14 1,79 0,07 -0,19 4,29
Observations: 13781 R-squared: 0,003
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Regression of dEMP on dRQ, dRQsq, dRL, dRLsq, dGDP, dUN
Robust
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
dRQ 30,13 9,00 3,35 0,00 12,49 47,76
dRQsq 192,96 70,59 2,73 0,01 54,59 331,33
dRL -22,93 8,91 -2,57 0,01 -40,39 -5,47
dRLsq 130,50 70,35 1,85 0,06 -7,40 268,40
dGDP -0,18 0,09 -2,04 0,04 -0,35 -0,01
dUN -0,86 0,30 -2,83 0,01 -1,45 -0,26
_cons 2,41 1,14 2,12 0,03 0,18 4,63
Observations: 13781 R-squared: 0,003
Regression of dEMP on dRQ, dRL, dGDP, dUN
Robust
Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
dRQ 17,14 6,93 2,48 0,01 3,57 30,72
dRL -13,52 7,29 -1,86 0,06 -27,80 0,76
dGDP -0,22 0,09 -2,56 0,01 -0,39 -0,05
dUN -0,87 0,30 -2,90 0,00 -1,46 -0,28
_cons 4,87 0,98 4,98 0,00 2,95 6,78
Observations: 13781 R-squared: 0,002
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